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25 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with IDA-WSEG Representatives on the DOD Vietnam Summer Study Project, held at CIA Headquarters, 22 July 1966, 10 a.m.

Present: Mr. Charles E. Fritz, IDA-WSEG
Mr. Dalbert Arnold, IDA-WSEG
Mr. Albert M. Bottom, IDA-WSEG

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Chief, D/T/RR, CIA
Chief, T/TR/RR, CIA

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1. Background: This meeting was arranged as a consequence of discussions in a meeting held 18 July 1966 and attended by [REDACTED] DTPS/RR, CIA, Colonel Marshall Sanders, ISA/Office of Secretary of Defense and some of the same IDA-WSEG representatives. [REDACTED] is the CIA Control Officer for the DOD Vietnam Summer Study Project. See the Memorandum For the Record dated 19 July 1966 prepared by [REDACTED] for further background on this subject.

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
2. Mr. Fritz and Mr. Arnold are interested primarily in the air war against North Vietnam. Mr. Bottom is interested in infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam and the general problem of logistics. A Mr. Armstrong, also a member of the study group but not present, at the meeting, is interested in manpower. Another member of the group, not present, is interested in ECM and the jamming of communications.

3. One of the major U.S. objectives in bombing North Vietnam (NVN) is assumed by this group to be to limit and reduce NVN's ability to conduct military operations in South Vietnam. This group wants to find out the extent to which U.S. bombing has fulfilled this objective; and the extent to which this objective could be fulfilled if all remaining JCS targets were struck in a rapidly phased sequence. The group is also investigating whether there are militarily feasible and politically acceptable alternative approaches for bombing NVN that would serve to achieve this objective more surely, more rapidly, and with less cost. I am attaching an additional list of questions which the IDA-WSEG group tabled as a statement of their interests and as topics for further discussion. (Attachment 1).

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4. The line of questioning of Fritz and Arnold followed along the lines of the above. Requests were made for basic papers on target systems, targets studies, studies appraising the effects of the bombing and proposals for the future course of the air war. I told the IDA-WSHC representatives that the reports furnished them by DIA were for the most part joint CIA-DIA studies and represent the best available in the field. I also acknowledged that CIA has prepared some internal and tightly controlled staff and working papers dealing with various aspects of the air war against North Vietnam, but that I would have to inquire whether these papers could be released to the IDA-WSHC representatives. Mr. Arnold also said that he would like to talk to working level analysts concerned with the bombing of North Vietnam, and read any working papers that might be available on this subject. No commitment was made in response to this request.

5. The discussion then concentrated on proposals for the future. Mr. Fritz and Mr. Arnold apparently had had access to a JCS planning study of potential target systems such as mining of the principal ports, electric power stations, coal mines and the red river dikes. The undersigned was asked specifically if the estimates contained in SHIR 10.1.66, Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 4 February 1966, TOP SECRET, CONTROLLED DISSEM, SENSITIVE were still valid. To this inquiry I replied that it has been some time since I have reviewed these findings and that I could not at this time give a judgment.

6. Mr. Bottom stated that he considered the USIB Memorandum, Infiltration and Logistics - South Vietnam, October 1965, the best source he had found dealing with the subject although it is now somewhat dated. SHIR 14.3-66, North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam, July 1966 is, of course, very useful according to Bottom, but he needs to get behind the figures and estimates and find out on what they are based. He said that he had had some useful conversations with Lt. Col. Weedus of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, U.S. Army, but had been referred by Lt. Col. Weedus to CIA for the answers to many of his questions. Mr. Bottom needs to become current on all aspects of infiltration of men and supplies to South Vietnam, and the entire Communist logistics problem including the economy of the Viet Cong. A great deal of interest was also expressed in the role of Cambodia.

7. The only commitments made in this area were as follows:

a. We will arrange to have our specialist on sea infiltration brief Mr. Bottom on the information we have on this subject, and

b. We will have our specialists on the requirements for the Communist military forces in South Vietnam discuss their estimates with

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Mr. Bottom and highlight the peculiar problem of the weight of the legal load of examination, after he has been briefed on logistic estimating by DIA.

8. Before leaving, Mr. Fritz mentioned that another member of the study group is interested in jamming of communications and ECM in general. In this connection this member would like to talk to a specialist on the nature of telecommunications in North Vietnam, and also to someone who has done some work on ECM. I suggested that the Communications Branch could provide a briefing on the nature of telecommunications in North Vietnam. Mr. Arnold will be in touch with me during the next few days to determine the future course of CIA cooperation with the IDA-WHEG group.

9. Both I and Chief T/TR had been cautioned prior to the meeting not to make any commitments regarding the transmittal of published intelligence, or sources and methods. It was apparent, however, that the IDA-WHEG representatives were familiar with sources, and that either through their own experiences or through discussions with others they also had some grasp of methods commonly used in the intelligence community. In addition, it was apparent that these men knew that CIA has prepared studies on almost every important aspect of the war in Indo-China. Since these people have been directed to prepare a study by the Secretary of Defense we believe that they have a legitimate need to know. We also believe that it is in the interest of the Agency that they use the intelligence produced here. To deny these people intelligence now may create problems for us in the future. For these reasons we recommend that some of the more pertinent reports dealing with the war be made available to the IDA-WHEG group working on the DOD Vietnam Summer Study Project. A condition to the release of these papers would be that CIA have the opportunity to review their use in whatever paper or report is prepared for presentation to the Wallerley working group. See Attachment 2 for a list of these reports.

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Chief, D/T

Enclosures:

Attachment 1 - A list of questions

Attachment 2 - A list of reports

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